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WILKINSON V. AUSTIN AND THE QUEST
FOR A CLEARLY DEFINED LIBERTY
INTEREST STANDARD
I. INTRODUCTION
One day, while waiting for food at the Southern Ohio Correctional
Facility, inmate Kevin Roe was hit over the head with a spatula by another
inmate.' Though Roe refused to fight back, he was soon transferred to the
Ohio State Penitentiary ("OSP"), a high-maximum security prison in
Youngsville, Ohio.2 OSP administrators locked Roe in his cell for twenty-
three hours a day, seven days a week. He could leave only to shower and
to use the "recreation room," a small room with a grate to the outside to
allow air circulation.4 Roe's only contact with the outdoors was through
this single grate.5
The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction ("Department")
justified Roe's placement at OSP because Roe was "a longtime member of
a gang and had participated in a racial disturbance over five years ago."6
Yet, evidence demonstrated only "some past connection to the Aryan
Brotherhood" and no role in the alleged disturbance.7 More strikingly,
during Roe's initial reclassification hearing, he received a negative score on
a supervision review form, a score which qualified him for a security
classification decrease, not an increase.8 Furthermore, although the
reclassification committee continued to recommend lowering Roe's security
1 Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719, 732 (N.D. Ohio 2002), affid in part, rev 'd in
part, 372 F.3d 246 (6th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 125 S. Ct. 2384 (2005).
2 id.
3 STATE OF OHIO CORR. INST. INSPECTION COMM., INSPECTION REPORT, OHIO STATE
PENITENTIARY, 123rd Gen. Assem. (1999), available at http://www.ciic.state.oh.us/
publications/osp-page.html [hereinafter INSPECTION REPORT].
4 Austin, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 724.
SId.
6 Id. at 732.
Id. at 732-33.
8 Id. at 732.
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classification and releasing him from OSP back to the general prison
population, Roe remained confined at OSP for over two years.9
OSP is a maximum-security, "Supermax,' prison designed to house
Ohio's most dangerous and disruptive inmates.'I At OSP, inmates are
subject to extreme solitary confinement and sensory deprivation: contact
with other people is strictly limited, and prisoners have little access to the
outdoors." A group of inmates challenged the OSP placement procedures,
claiming that transfer to OSP violated the procedural due process
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 2
In Wilkinson v. Austin, the Supreme Court found that inmates have a
liberty interest in avoiding transfer to OSP, saying that the severe
conditions at OSP, combined with loss of parole eligibility, impose an
atypical and significant hardship on inmates. 13  However, the Court
declined to impose additional procedural requirements, holding that notice
and the opportunity to be heard are sufficient to meet the requirements of
procedural due process. 14
The Court's holding in Austin was correct. However, because the
Court failed to clearly articulate a single liberty interest standard that
addresses the needs of inmates that face transfer to Supermax prisons, its
opinion fails to give adequate guidance to both prison administrators and
lower courts. Consequently, future courts faced with similar challenges
will struggle with a number of issues left unaddressed by the Court. The
first issue is whether a liberty interest can be invoked by either conditions
of confinement that impose atypical and significant hardship or loss of
parole eligibility. Second, the baseline used to determine atypical and
significant hardship still must be established. Finally, a previously-defined
list of procedural requirements must be reconciled with the balancing test
articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge15 to determine which of these
requirements would benefit an inmate without overly burdening the
government.
9 Id. at 732-33.
10 INSPECTION REPORT, supra note 3.
11Id.
12 Austin, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 721.
13 Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 2394-95 (2005).
14 Id. at 2397.




A. THE RISE OF THE SUPERMAX PRISON
The term "Supermax" generally refers to "maximum security or close
custody segregation units which are designed and/or operated to provide
some combination of greater isolation among prisoners, less contact with
staff, less out-of-cell time, and less access to or sight of the outdoors than in
the traditional prison segregation unit."'16 Supermax prisons concentrate the
most dangerous inmates in one facility, thereby making the rest of the
prison system safer. 17 Furthermore, Supermax prisons control their inmates
through modem solitary confinement: "[E]xtreme social isolation, reduced
environmental stimulus, the absence of recreational, vocational and
educational opportunities and extraordinary levels of surveillance and
control."
18
During the nineteenth century, United States' prison officials
attempted, then abandoned long-term solitary confinement.' 9 One observer
in New York commented that "[t]his experiment, of which such favourable
results had been anticipated, proved fatal for the majority of prisoners. It
devours the victim incessantly, and unmercifully; it does not reform, it kills.
The unfortunate creatures submitted to this experiment wasted away ....
The extreme impact of solitary confinement can be traced to the near
complete lack of sensory stimulation. 2 1 Research demonstrates that "the
conscious mind is dependent on constant contact with the outside
world .... Unless there is the constant incoming flood of sensation,
behavior is highly disturbed as to bring on what amounts to transient
psychotic states. 2 Consequently, solitary confinement can lead to extreme
16 Brief of Corrections Professionals as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 8 n.1,
Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384 (No. 04-495) [hereinafter Corrections Professionals].
17 INSPECTION REPORT, supra note 3.
18 Id.
19 Brief of Professors and Practitioners of Psychology and Psychiatry as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 9 n.1 1, Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384 (No. 04-495). The brief noted that
Maryland, Massachusetts, Maine, New Jersey, Virginia and Rhode Island all attempted to
introduce complete solitary confinement in their prisons in the first half of the nineteenth
century. Id. By 1858, all states had abandoned their attempts. Id.
20 Id. at 7 (quoting TORSTEN ERIKSSON, THE REFORMERS, AN HISTORICAL SURVEY OF
PIONEER EXPERIMENTS IN THE TREATMENT OF CRIMINALS 49 (1976)).
21 Id. at 10.
22 Id. at 10 n. 15 (quoting P. Solomon, Quantitative Aspects of Sensory Deprivation, in
THE PSYCHODYNAMIC IMPLICATIONS OF PHYSIOLOGICAL STUDIES ON SENSORY DEPRIVATION
28,47 (Leo Madow & Laurence H. Snow eds., 1970)).
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dysfunction, 23 such as "verbal aggression, physical destruction of
surroundings, and the development of an inner fantasy world, including
paranoid psychosis. 24  Despite this evidence, in the past twenty years,
prison officials have increasingly relied on Supermax prisons to control
violent and disruptive inmates, and gang activity within their prison
systems.25
B. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The procedural due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees that no state can deprive a person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.26 A state's decision to deprive a person must
be neither arbitrary nor mistaken, and must adhere to some minimum
requirement of due process.27 As a person's interest in the life, liberty or
property increases, the requirements needed to meet minimum due process
also increase.
28
The ordinary citizen is free from governmental restraint and may
engage in any activity he pleases. Thus, he has the utmost interest in
preserving his liberty. Consequently, the government can only imprison a
person after a lengthy trial in which his due process rights are preserved.29
Imprisonment reduces, but does not completely abolish, the constitutional
rights of prisoners. 30  Prisoners still retain the right to procedural due
process. 31 However, as will be discussed below in Part II.C., the extent to
which this protection applies depends on the liberty interest at stake.
23 See id. at 11.
24 Id. at 15.
25 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L INST. OF CORRS., SUPERMAX HOUSING: A SURVEY OF
CURRENT PRACTICE 3 (1997), available at http://nicic.org/pubs/1997/013722.pdf ("Fifteen
[S]upermax facilities or units were opened from 1989 through 1993, and five more from
1994 through 1996. Five additional facilities or units are projected to be opened by 1999.")
[hereinafter SUPERMAX HOUSING].
26 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . .
27 See id.
28 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974).
29 See id. at 556; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972).
'0 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555.
31 Id. at 556.
[Vol. 961032
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C. THE PRISONER'S LIBERTY INTEREST
1. Early Release
Once an inmate is convicted and sentenced, he does not have a
constitutionally-protected right to be released before his sentence expires.32
However, if the state creates a right to or an expectation of early release,
then the inmate does have a liberty interest in that right or expectation that
is entitled to procedural due process protection.33 The extent to which
parole is treated as a liberty interest entitled to due process protection
depends on the extent to which an inmate expects parole and its ensuing
freedoms.34
a. The Right to Parole
Parole is a kind of restricted freedom: the parolee lives a relatively
normal life, save the occasional visit to his parole officer and the threat that
otherwise normal activities can lead to the revocation of this freedom.35 In
Morrissey v. Brewer, the Court held that once an inmate is paroled, his
liberty interest is clearly established.36  Though the former inmate is not
entitled to full freedom, the parolee's release from prison "includes many of
the core values of unqualified liberty[,] and its termination inflicts a
grievous loss on the parolee and often on others. 37 Since the parolee's
liberty is not equivalent to that of someone who has not been convicted of a
crime, parole revocation does not require trial-like, adversarial procedures.
38
However, the Supreme Court held that to revoke parole, the minimum
requirements of due process include:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of
evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses
and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing
32 Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).
31 Wolff 418 U.S. at 557.
34 See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 1 (holding that a statutorily derived expectation of parole
was a liberty interest that required minimal due process protection); Wolff, 418 U.S. 539
(holding that a loss of good-time credits was a liberty interest that required more than
minimal due process protection, but less protection than revocation of parole); Morrissey,
408 U.S. 471 (holding that revocation of parole was a liberty interest that required significant
due process protection, though a trial was not required).






confrontation); (e) a "neutral and detached" hearing body such as a traditional parole
board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking
parole.
39
b. Good Time Credits
Similarly, in Wolff v. McDonnell, the Court held that when the state
creates a right to good time credits 40 and deprives that right only in the
event of major misconduct, deprivation of those credits is subject to
procedural due process protection. 41 By creating the right, the state in effect
has acknowledged that good time credits are a liberty interest that can only
be forfeited for serious misconduct-and therefore cannot be forfeited
arbitrarily or at the discretion of prison officials, but, rather, only if certain
procedural requirements are followed. 2
The loss of good time credits, however, is not equivalent to parole
revocation.43 Parole revocation converts a nearly-free person to a prisoner,
while loss of good time credits merely postpones the possibility of, not the
right to, freedom.44 Therefore, the minimum procedural requirements to
deprive an inmate of good time credits are similar to, but less stringent than,
those outlined in Morrissey.45 Specifically, the Supreme Court suggested
that in a hearing for good time credit deprivation, the prison must allow
inmates to call witnesses and present evidence in their defense. 6 However,
the Court declined to require this procedure, citing the need to balance the
inmate's interest with prison officials' discretion in prison administration.47
" Id. at 489.
40 "Good time" refers to "[tihat length of time, fixed by statute, by which the prison term
of a convict is shortened by reason of his good behavior while in prison." BALLANTINE'S
LAW DICTIONARY (1969). In Wolff, the Nebraska statute required the chief executive officer
of the prison to reduce prison terms for "good behavior and faithful performance of duties."
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 547 n.6 (1974). However, the prisoner could forfeit the
reduction due to misconduct. Id.
41 Wolff 418 U.S. at 557.
42 Id. at 557-59.




47 Id. at 565. Justice Marshall dissented, arguing that
[w]ithout the enforceable right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, an accused
inmate is not guaranteed the right to present any defense beyond his own word. Without any
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, the inmate is afforded no means to
challenge the word of his accusers. Without these procedures, a disciplinary board cannot




Finally, if the decision to grant parole is discretionary, a
constitutionally-protected right to parole will be created only by statutory
language.48 However, even this right requires only minimum due process
procedures.49 In Greenholtz, the prisoners challenged the procedures for
discretionary parole, a decision made by the Nebraska Parole Board.50 The
Supreme Court first held that an inmate has no inherent right to be released
before his sentence expires.51 When a governing board decides to grant
parole at its discretion, the inmate has no inherent right to parole and
therefore no constitutionally-protected interest. 52 The Court distinguished
Morrissey, saying that "[t]here is a crucial distinction between being
deprived of a liberty one has, as in parole, and being denied a conditional
liberty that one desires. 53 A desire for the freedom brought by parole is not
sufficient to create a liberty interest.
54
Instead, the Court held that the inmates had a protectable expectation
of discretionary parole that was created by Nebraska's statutory language.55
However, because the statute vested broad discretion in the Parole Board,
only minimal due process procedures were required.56 The Court held that
the opportunity for the inmate to be heard and notice of why parole was
denied were sufficient to meet this minimal standard.57
Id. at 581-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
48 See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11
(1979).
49 See id. at 13.
5' Id. at 3-4.
"' Id. at 7.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
54 Id.
-5 Id. at 11. The statute read in part:
Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed offender who is eligible for
release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is of the opinion that his release should be
deferred because:
(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of parole;
(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote disrespect for law;
(c) His release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline; or
(d) His continued corrections treatment, medical care, or vocational or other training in the
facility will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a law-abiding life when released at a
later date.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1, 114(1) (1976).
56 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 13.
17 Id. at 16.
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Justice Powell dissented, remarking that "[r]elease on parole marks the
first time when the severe restrictions imposed on a prisoner's liberty by the
prison regimen may be lifted, and his behavior in prison often is molded by
his hope and expectation of securing parole at the earliest time permitted by
law." 58 Thus, "a prisoner justifiably expects release on parole when he
meets the standards of eligibility applicable within that system., 59 Powell
would have required that prisons provide inmates reasonable notice of the
hearing and the factors to be considered before the hearing, as well as a
written statement of the reasons and facts used in an adverse decision after
the hearing.60
2. Confinement: The Atypical Conditions Requirement
The Supreme Court has typically refused to recognize that an inmate
has a liberty interest in avoiding prison transfer unless applicable state law
or policy exists.61 Once convicted, the inmate is subject to the rules of a
prison system-"so long as the conditions of confinement do not otherwise
violate the Constitution., 62  In Meachum v. Fano, prison officials had
complete discretion to make any placement decision.63 Therefore, prisoners
had no constitutionally-protected right to remain in a certain prison, because
Massachusetts law did not create any expectation of that right.
64
On the other hand, in Hewitt v. Helms, the Court held that when a state
establishes procedural guidelines that govern placement in administrative
segregation, the state has created a protected liberty interest.65 The Hewitt
approach required courts to review the language of a particular regulation or
statute to find a liberty interest. 66 This approach proved unworkable for two
reasons. First, by creating a liberty interest that depended on state
regulations and policy, states had a significant incentive not to codify their
procedures.67 After all, liberty interests cannot be found in regulations that
do not exist. In addition, the Supreme Court expressed concern that "the
58 Id. at 19-20 (Powell, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 20 (Powell, J., dissenting).
60 Id. at 23 (Powell, J., dissenting).
61 See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983);
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
62 Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224.
63 Id. at 226.
64 id.
65 Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471-72.
66 Sandin, 515 U.S. at 481.
67 Id. at 482.
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Hewitt approach has led to the involvement of federal courts in the day-to-
day management of prisons .... 68
Thus, in Sandin v. Conner, the Court overruled the "combing the
regulations" approach. 69 Relying on Wolff the Court held that states may
create liberty interests that are protected by the Due Process Clause.70
However, these interests
will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the
sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due
Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship
on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
7 1
The "atypical and significant hardship" standard requires courts to
compare conditions of a prison or type of segregation against some
"typical" baseline of prison life to determine whether an inmate has an
interest in avoiding transfer.7 In Sandin, the Court held that placement in
disciplinary confinement did not give rise to a protected liberty interest
because the conditions in disciplinary confinement were similar to
administrative segregation,73 and placement in administrative segregation
was entirely discretionary. 74  Thus, an inmate has a liberty interest in
avoiding placement only if the conditions impose "atypical and significant
hardship.75 Conditions that mirror discretionary segregation do not impose
such hardship.76
6 Id. at 482. In Hewitt, the Court also expressed concern about judicial deference,
saying "[p]rison administrators ... should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the
adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to
preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." 459 U.S. at 472
(quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)).
69 Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483.
70 Id. at 483-84.
71 Id. at 484 (internal citations removed).
72 See id.
73 Id. at 486. In Sandin, the differences between administrative segregation and
disciplinary confinement were subtle but significant. Id. at 489 n.1 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). In both, inmates were placed in the same single-cell units and had similar
privileges revoked. Id. at 476 n.2. However, placement in administrative segregation was
discretionary, and therefore not noted on an inmate's record. Id. at 489 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Conversely, an inmate could only be placed in disciplinary segregation because
of serious misconduct. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Therefore, disciplinary segregation
would adversely affect an inmate's prospects for parole. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
'4 Id. at 486.
71 Id. at 484.
76 Id. at 486.
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The Court decided Sandin by a five-to-four margin, with Justices
Ginsburg, Stevens, Breyer and Souter dissenting." Justice Ginsburg
distinguished disciplinary confinement from administrative segregation
because disciplinary confinement "also stigmatizes [inmates] and
diminishes parole prospects. 78  The "immediate and lingering
consequences," Ginsburg argued, are sufficient to invoke a liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause. 7 9  Justice Breyer also agreed that
disciplinary segregation caused significant deprivation. 80  Furthermore,
Breyer pointed out that "the Due Process Clause does not require process
unless, in the individual case, there is a relevant factual dispute between the
parties.",8' Only when there is a relevant factual dispute will additional
procedures, such as calling a witness, be useful. According to Breyer, this
requirement helps guard against meritless cases-if there is no evidence of
a factual dispute, there is nothing to be gained by invoking the additional
procedures of the Due Process Clause.82
III. PRESENTATION OF THE CASE
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In May 1998, the State of Ohio opened the Ohio State Penitentiary, a
Supermax facility designed to hold 504 male inmates. 83 Ohio sought to
control "predatory and dangerous prisoners" by isolating them from the
general prison population.84
At OSP, inmates face highly restrictive conditions, including solitary
confinement and sensory deprivation:
85
Inmates are locked in their solid door-front cells 23 hours each day. Each solid-front
cell door has a small, thick glass window and a key controlled "food slot" hatch. Each
cell is approximately 89.7 square feet and allows for a small degree of natural light.
Privileges are very restricted and limited. Tape recorders, cassette tapes, fans,
typewriters [or access to typewriters], and smokeless tobacco, are not permitted....
17 See id.
78 Id. at 489 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
79 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
80 Id. at 502 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 503 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
82 See id. at 504 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
83 Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719, 732 (N.D. Ohio 2002), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 372 F.3d 246 (6th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 125 S. Ct. 2384 (2005).
84 Id. at 723 (quoting the deposition of Reginald Wilkinson, the director of the Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction).
85 Id.
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One (1) hour of recreation per day is allowed at least five (5) times per week. All
meals are delivered to inmates at their cells.
86
Although the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction began
transferring inmates to OSP as early as May 1998, the Department did not
establish a policy to govern those transfers until August 31, 1998.87 Despite
the implementation of this policy, the Department continued to transfer
inmates to or retain them at OSP without a hearing or contrary to the
recommendations of a reclassification committee.8
On January 1, 2001, a class of current and former inmates of OSP filed
a complaint in the Northern District Court of Ohio, stating both a
procedural due process claim regarding placement at OSP and an Eighth
Amendment claim regarding conditions at OSP.89 The Eighth Amendment
claim was settled before trial.90
The district court found a liberty interest because, under Sandin, the
conditions at OSP "are atypical and impose a significant hardship." 91
Additionally, the district court found that the plaintiffs were not afforded
due process when placed at OSP. 92  The district court ordered several
substantive and procedural modifications to the Department's current
version of the placement and retention policy ("New Policy"), which were
implemented on the eve of trial.93 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
86 INSPECTION REPORT, supra note 3.
87 Austin, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 727.
88 Austin v. Wilkinson, 372 F.3d 346, 350 (6th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 125 S. Ct. 2384 (2005);
see also Austin, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 723-36. For example, James DeJarnette was transferred
to OSP after assaulting an officer, even though the discipline committee "unanimously
agreed against increasing his classification level and transferring him to the OSP." Id. at
728 (emphasis added). Lahray Thompson was transferred to OSP because of alleged gang
affiliations. Id. at 734. The evidence used to justify his transfer included affiliation with the
Crips gang several years before, a tattoo often associated with the Crips, and the mere fact
that he once wrote a letter using a letter "b" commonly used by Crips members. Id. at 735.
See also supra text accompanying notes 1-9.
89 Austin, 372 F.3d at 350; see also Austin, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719.
90 Austin, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 722.
91 Id. at 740-43.
92 Id. at 749.
93 Austin v. Wilkinson, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1026-29 (N.D. Ohio 2002), affd in part,
rev'd in part 372 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 125 S. Ct. 2384 (2005). The procedural
modifications ordered by the District Court included: written notice at least forty-eight hours
before the hearing, along with written notice "of all the grounds believed to justify [an
inmate's] placement at [the highest security level] and a summary of the evidence that the
defendants will rely upon for the placement," the opportunity to call reasonable witnesses,
and a summary of the evidence that supports the recommendation. Id. at 1026-27. The
substantive modifications addressed the grounds that merit transfer to OSP. The district
court ordered the Department to describe the type and quantity of contraband, to "clearly set
2006] 1039
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court's finding of a liberty interest and affirmed the procedural
modifications but reversed the substantive modifications.94
B. THE OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
In a unanimous opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court held
that the inmates had established a constitutionally-protected liberty interest
in avoiding assignment at OSP.95 However, the Court also found that the
New Policy implemented by the Department satisfied the constitutional
requirement for procedural due process and reversed the district court's
modifications.96
1. The Liberty Interest
The Court began its analysis by noting that a liberty interest may arise
from the language of the Constitution itself or from "an expectation or
interest created by state laws or policies. 97 The Court first noted that in
Meachum, the Court held that a liberty interest in avoiding transfer cannot
be found in the language of the Constitution itself because "[c]onfinement
in any of the State's institutions is within the normal limits or range of
custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose.
98
Therefore, any liberty interest in avoiding transfer must arise from state
policies or regulations.99
The Court affirmed the standard it articulated in Sandin: an inmate
may have a protected liberty interest if prison transfer "imposes atypical
and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents
of prison life." 100 However, despite the diversity of baselines used by the
out the type of security group threat or gang involvement that justified placement at [the
highest security level] classification," and to "clearly state the factors to be used for
reclassification." Id. at 1028.
94 Austin, 372 F.3d at 360.
95 Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 2393 (2005).
96 Id.
97 Id. In its brief to the Supreme Court, Ohio conceded that the inmates had a liberty
interest, Brief for Petitioners, Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384 (No. 04-495), but the United States,
which supported Ohio as amicus curiae, disagreed with Ohio's concession. Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384 (No. 04-
495). Consequently, Justice Scalia raised the issue during oral arguments, Transcript of Oral
Argument at 2-4, Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384 (No. 04-495) [hereinafter Oral Transcript], and the
Court addressed the issue in its decision. Austin, 125 S. Ct. at 2393-95.
98 Austin, 125 S. Ct. at 2393 (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976)).
99 Id.
100 Id. at 2394 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).
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circuit courts, the Court declined to establish the appropriate baseline.'01
Instead, the Court found that assignment to OSP "impose[d] an atypical and
significant hardship under any plausible baseline."'
0 2
Two conditions struck the Court as especially atypical: the indefinite
duration of placement at OSP, and the fact that placement disqualified
inmates from parole consideration. 10 3 Otherwise, the Court observed that
the conditions at OSP "likely would apply to most solitary confinement
facilities .... ,104 The duration and the parole disqualification, together,
imposed enough of a hardship to create a liberty interest in avoiding
assignment to OSP.
2. The Procedural Requirements
With a liberty interest established, the Court turned to the question of
due process. The Court initially noted that the requirements of due process
are flexible and depend on the particular situation and circumstances in
question.'0 5 Thus, courts typically evaluate these requirements within the
framework that the Supreme Court first articulated in Mathews v.
Eldridge:
10 6
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail. 
107
Thus, in any due process evaluation, courts will balance three factors:
1) the private interest at issue; 2) the risk of erroneous deprivation, along
with the value of additional safeguards; and 3) the additional burden on the
state presented by those safeguards.' 
08
In this case, the interest at issue was the right to avoid erroneous
placement at OSP-the right to avoid extremely severe confinement. 10 9
101 Id.; see infra Section IV.A.2; see also Maximilienne Bishop, Note: Supermax
Prisons: Increasing Security or Permitting Persecution?, 47 ARIz. L. REv. 461, 476 (2005)
(noting that "[d]ifferent courts use different baselines for comparison").
102 Austin, 125 S. Ct. at 2394.
103 Id. at 2394-95.
104 Id. at 2394.
105 Id. at 2395.
106 Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).





The Court observed that prisoners by definition have their liberty curtailed,
whether or not they are placed at OSP. 110 The prisoner whose liberty is
already curtailed is entitled to fewer procedural protections than the free
person who, when facing imprisonment, is entitled to a full trial."'
Under Mathews, the second factor addresses the current procedures:
the risk of erroneous placement and the value of any additional or
alternative safeguards." 2 The Court stressed that under the New Policy, the
inmate received notice of the factual basis for his consideration for OSP
placement, as well as the opportunity for rebuttal. 13 These safeguards "are
among the most important procedural mechanisms for purposes of avoiding
erroneous deprivations."114 In addition, the New Policy provided that the
recommendation for placement would be reviewed at several levels and that
the process would terminate at any level if the recommendation for transfer
were overturned. 15  If OSP placement was recommended, the policy
required the reviewer to note the reasons for that recommendation, reducing
the risk of an arbitrary decision by giving the inmates a basis for objection
at each level of review. 116 Finally, the New Policy provided a placement
review within thirty days of the inmate's initial assignment to OSP, which
further reduced the risk of erroneous placement.' 17
Finally, the Court analyzed Ohio's interest and the burden that
additional procedural safeguards would place on Ohio. Ohio has a
significant interest in ensuring safety within its prison system." 8 At stake
are the lives of its guards, prison personnel, the general public and the
prisoners themselves. 19 The obligation to protect these interests implicates
another important state interest: limited and often scarce resources.'2 0 Any
additional expenditure draws funding from critical prison programs, such as
education and vocational assistance.' 21  Thus, "[c]ourts must give
substantial deference to prison management decisions" before imposing




112 Id. at 2395-96.












The Court noted that procedural requirements of a more adversarial-
type hearing, such as the ability to call and cross-examine witnesses, would
threaten Ohio's control over its prison system.1 23 For example, a prisoner
who testifies as a witness against another prisoner may be subject to
retaliation. 24 The Court did not discuss the value or burden of any other
additional procedural requirement, including those addressed by the district
court.
125
Thus, after balancing the three Mathews factors, the Court determined
that the New Policy adequately safeguards an inmate's interest in avoiding
transfer to OSP. 126 Because the inmate's liberty interest is not nearly as
significant as the right to be free from confinement, only informal, non-
adversarial procedures are required to safeguard his interest. 27 The New
Policy provides notice, the opportunity to be heard and several levels of
review, and "strikes a constitutionally permissible balance between the
factors of the Mathews framework."'' 28 Thus, the Supreme Court upheld
Ohio's New Policy and reversed the procedural modifications ordered by
the district court.
IV. CASE ANALYSIS
Though the Supreme Court's holding in Wilkinson v. Austin is correct,
the Court failed to answer three questions which are likely to arise in future
litigation: 1) what additional constraints on a prisoner's freedom will merit
the procedural protections of the Fourteenth Amendment; 2) what is the
liberty interest from which this protection derives-the interest in parole or
the hardship of confinement; and 3) what are the minimum requirements of
that procedural protection.
The Court lost this opportunity to establish a single, coherent standard
by which a prisoner can invoke a liberty interest. Although the Court
analyzed the conditions at OSP using the "atypical and significant
hardship" test, the Court refused to establish the baseline against which
atypical would be compared and found that both loss of parole eligibility
and confinement were required to establish a liberty interest.129 A better
test would be to hold that 1) confinement that imposes atypical and
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 See supra note 93 for a description of procedural requirements ordered by the district
court.
126 Austin, 125 S. Ct. at 2397.
127 Id.




significant hardship; or 2) the loss of parole eligibility is independently
sufficient to create a liberty interest. Furthermore, the baseline against
which atypical and significant hardship will be compared remains
undefined. Finally, the Mathews balancing test must be reconciled with the
Morrissey procedural requirements to establish procedures that adequately
safeguard due process protection without overly burdening the government.
A. A CLEARLY ARTICULATED LIBERTY INTEREST TEST
1. Parole
The reasoning of the parole cases (Wolff, Morrissey, and Greenholtz)
suggests that the loss of parole eligibility is independently sufficient to
invoke a liberty interest, separate from the atypical hardship imposed by the
confinement rule articulated in Sandin.130  Instead, in Austin, the Court
ruled that the loss of parole eligibility was merely an important factor to
consider when determining whether a liberty interest existed. 
131
These cases demonstrate that the Court finds a liberty interest in parole
revocation. 132 Furthermore, inmates have a liberty interest in both the right
to parole,133 and the statutorily-derived expectation of parole. 134 In reaching
these decisions, the Court reasoned that the freedom granted by parole so
closely resembled the freedom of normal life that a person had a liberty
interest in retaining parole 135 or being granted parole. 136 The expectation of
that freedom was sufficient to invoke a liberty interest.1
37
Similarly, a transfer or placement that leads to the loss of parole
eligibility should create a liberty interest, independent of the issue of
confinement. In both Wo/ff and Greenholtz, the Court showed a willingness
to create a liberty interest in the right to and expectation of freedom. In
Austin, inmates transferred to OSP automatically lost their eligibility for
freedom. 138 Although eligibility for is not equivalent to the expectation of
130 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972).
131 Austin, 125 S. Ct. at 2395.
132 See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482.
131 See Wo/ff, 418 U.S. at 557.
134 See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11
(1979).
135 See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482.
136 See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557.
137 See id.
138 See Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719, 732 (N.D. Ohio 2002), affid in part,
rev'd in part, 372 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 125 S. Ct. 2384 (2005).
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freedom, inmates eligible for parole at least expect that they will be
considered for parole-near-total freedom. 139  The Due Process Clause
should protect this expectation because the interest at stake-freedom-is
so important to the inmate.
1 40
In his dissent in Greenholtz, Justice Powell addressed the importance
of the parole-release determination to the inmate.1 4' The expectation of
parole provides an important incentive to inmates, guiding their behavior in
hopes of early release. 142 Consequently, prison administrators have the
utmost interest in properly conducting the parole-release determination. A
fair decision-making process motivates an inmate to follow the rules in
hope of release, which promotes the safety and security of the prison
system.
One argument against this analysis is that the statutory basis for
finding a liberty interest in the expectation of parole does not exist in Ohio.
In Greenholtz, the Court created a liberty interest in the expectation of
parole because language in the statute suggested that parole would be
granted routinely, save several delineated exceptions.143 However, the Ohio
Code grants routine parole eligibility,'44 but once eligible, an inmate is
granted parole only at the parole board's discretion.145 Nothing in the Ohio
code suggests that parole will be granted routinely or automatically-only
upon review by the parole board.
Nevertheless, dictum in Sandin suggests that the Court will focus the
liberty interest inquiry on the "nature of the deprivation," rather than
statutory language. 46 Therefore, the Court will not look at the words of a
particular statute, but rather what is at stake. 147 When eligibility for parole
is at stake, nothing less than the chance for freedom is at stake.
Although loss of parole and parole eligibility should be an independent
reason to create a liberty interest, the atypical and significant hardship test
articulated in Sandin still governs. In other words, a transfer that leads to
the loss of parole can create a liberty interest only if that loss of parole
139 See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11.
140 See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471.
141 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 20 (Powell, J., dissenting).
142 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
143 Id. at 11; see supra note 55 for text of statute.
144 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.13 (LexisNexis 2006).
145 Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.drc.state.oh.us/web/FAQ.htm#Parole (last visited June 9, 2006).




imposes atypical and significant hardship. 48 If the transfer does not lead to
a loss of parole eligibility, or that loss does not impose atypical and
significant hardship, no liberty interest is created. Therefore, courts must
still look to some baseline condition to determine whether the loss of parole
is atypical.
49
2. Typical and Insignificant Hardship: The Baseline
a. The Circuit Split
Courts will invoke a liberty interest when transfer or placement results
in conditions that impose "atypical and significant hardship."' 150 However,
the Court did not determine what the baseline for that comparison would
be-what is typical and insignificant hardship. 151  Instead, it held that
conditions at OSP would meet this test "under any plausible baseline."'
' 52
This issue is especially significant in light of several courts of appeals'
decisions following Sandin. Since 1995, courts of appeals have discussed
what the baseline in Sandin should be. The Fourth and the Ninth Circuits
have used the conditions of the general prison population in the state in
question, 153 while the Seventh Circuit looks at conditions statewide,
including the most restrictive confinement available.154 The Second and
Third Circuits and the District of Columbia Circuit follow Sandin, using
administrative segregation as the baseline."' The Fifth Circuit alone holds
that only a transfer that lengthens a prisoner's sentence will invoke a liberty
interest.'56  Finally, the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue in Austin,
upholding the district court's decision to use typical segregation conditions
as the baseline. 157
148 See infra Section IV.A.2.
149 Examples of such conditions could include whether prisoners in the general prison
population can lose parole eligibility at the discretion of prison administrators, see, e.g.,
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), or whether
prisoners in administrative segregation lose eligibility for parole. See, e.g., Sandin, 515 U.S.
472.
5 See Sandin, 515 U.S. 472.
151 Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 2394 (2005).
152 Id.
153 Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 503 (4th Cir. 1997); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083,
1089 (9th Cir. 1996).
154 Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1997).
155 Hatch v. District of Columbia, 184 F.3d 846, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Griffin v. Vaughn,
112 F.3d 703, 708 (3d Cir. 1997); Brooks v. DeFasi, 112 F.3d 46,49 (2d Cir. 1997).
156 Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31-32 (5th Cir. 1995).
157 Austin v. Wilkinson, 372 F.3d 346, 350 (6th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 125 S. Ct. 2384
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Consequently, the question of whether placement invokes a liberty
interest depends not only on the conditions of that placement, but also the
jurisdiction in which the trial takes place. If the inconsistency were among
the states, this result might be understandable-after all, prisons are run and
administered by the states. However, the inconsistency is among the courts
of appeals; thus, the liberty to which a prisoner may be entitled depends on
the federal judicial jurisdiction in which the prison is found.
This issue is easily resolved by determining which baseline is
appropriate as the comparison for atypical and significant hardship. The
baseline is, initially, critical because it determines what is "typical." Courts
can only address the question of atypical after the baseline is determined.
Conditions that closely resemble the baseline would quickly be eliminated
from an atypical and significant hardship analysis.
Establishing the baseline would provide guidance to lower courts by
determining the starting point for the analysis. Once the correct baseline is
established, courts can analyze the typical/atypical issue and quickly
dispose of a large number of cases. Furthermore, a standard baseline would
provide guidance to future inmates who challenge prison procedural
requirements by resolving the conflict within the courts of appeals as well
as by indicating the chances of success of a liberty claim. Finally, a
standard baseline would ease prison administration, as prison officials
would be able to predict whether a transfer may implicate due process
considerations.
b. The Appropriate Baseline
The courts of appeals have used four different baselines in the atypical
and significant hardship analysis: (1) the effect on the length of sentence,
(2) the conditions faced by typical inmates, (3) the most restrictive prison
conditions statewide, and (4) the conditions faced in administrative
segregation. 158 However, none of these approaches offers prisoners any
significant procedural protection against unwarranted transfer. 159
Increasing the length of the prison sentence is perhaps the harshest
test. 60 This baseline requires a "bright-line rule," whereby a liberty interest
will never be found unless a prisoner's sentence will almost certainly be
(2005).
158 See Section IV.A.2 supra.
159 See Donna H. Lee, The Law of Typicality: Examining the Procedural Due Process
Implications of Sandin v. Conner, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 785 (2004); Michael Z. Goldman,
Note: Sandin v. Conner and Intraprison Confinement: Ten Years of Confusion and Harm in
Prisoner Litigation, 45 B.C. L. REv. 423 (2004).
160 Goldman, supra note 159, at 446.
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lengthened because of the action in question. 16' Nothing else, no matter
how harsh, will invoke procedural due process protection.
The second baseline approach, conditions faced by typical inmates,
requires the courts to inquire into the facts of a particular prison system.
62
This approach is useful because it requires an empirical, objective finding
of "typical" and "significant."' 163 However, this fact-intensive approach has
proven difficult to apply, especially since prison officials rarely keep the
kind of statistics needed to conduct this analysis.' 64 Consequently, courts
have struggled when working with this approach as the baseline. 65
The Seventh Circuit is the only circuit to apply the third baseline
approach: the most restrictive conditions statewide. 66  The theory that
underlies this approach is the idea that it is arbitrary to "distinguish between
the different parts of the same prison, on one hand, and the different prisons
in the same system, on the other."' 167 Thus, any inquiry must examine
prison conditions statewide, rather than prison by prison. 68 This approach
essentially forecloses any determination of atypical and significant, since
the conditions imposed would have to be "significantly more restrictive
than conditions of confinement elsewhere within [the state's] prison
system.' 169 Using this baseline approach, a court could only find atypical
and significant hardship if the conditions imposed were unique to that
prisoner. 17 Otherwise, conditions found anywhere within the prison system
of that state would be typical and insignificant, however restrictive they
might be. 1
7 1
The Supreme Court favored the baseline of administrative segregation,
which several circuits have upheld.172 However, this baseline implies that
administrative segregation is a normal part of prison life. 7 3  While
administrative segregation may be imposed at the discretion of prison
officials, such segregation "is not typical of the normal inmate
161 Lee, supra note 159, at 828.
162 See id. at 817.
163 Id. at 789.
164 Lee, supra note 159, at 818; Goldman, supra note 159, at 456.
165 See Lee, supra note 159, at 813-17.
166 Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1997).
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 1177.
170 See id. at 1176.
171 See id.
172 See supra note 155.
173 See Goldman, supra note 159.
[Vol. 961048
WILKINSON v. AUSTIN
experience.' 74  Furthermore, any attempt to characterize disciplinary
confinement as insignificant, as in Sandin, ignores the reality that there are
"considerable dissimilarities between administrative and punitive
confinement in terms of the effects each respective sentence may have on a
prisoner's existence in prison," as well as "the devastating harm that
prolonged solitary confinement can have on prisoners."
1 75
One flaw in the current analysis by both the courts of appeals and the
Supreme Court is that it gives little weight to the second factor of the
Sandin test. 76 The Sandin test requires two considerations: (1) atypical and
(2) significant hardship.177 Yet, courts seem to consider both prongs at the
same time. 78 A better approach would be to consider each separately: (1)
whether the placement in question is objectively typical and (2) whether the
placement in question is a significant event. 
179
With this concern in mind, Professor Donna H. Lee of Brooklyn Law
School has proposed a multifactor balancing test. First, typicality is
determined by "empirical evidence of actual state practices."' 8  Then,
significance is "applied as a de minimis threshold test."'' Finally, "state
positive law 'should' continue to inform liberty interest analysis.' 82 The
first prong of this test requires the court to conduct a factually-intensive
analysis of the typical practices of a particular prison system, such as
statistics regarding placement, disciplinary proceedings and prisoner
classification. 83 The second prong allows the court to determine that the
alleged deprivation is potentially significant, thereby eliminating meritless
claims. 184 Finally, the third prong uses
state law as an evidentiary tool for determining whether a deprivation implicates a
liberty interest and warrants procedural due process protection .... For example, if a
state has detailed statutes and regulations governing classification as a sex offender,
then the very existence of that state law is evidence of the significance of the
underlying issue. Conversely, if a state's statute regarding placement in
administrative segregation is broadly framed and gives prison officials considerable
'74 Id. at 458.
171 Id. at 463.
176 Id. at 462.
177 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,484 (1995).
178 Goldman, supra note 159, at 462.
"9 Id. at 459-66.
IS0 Lee, supra note 159, at 835.
181 Id.
182 id.
183 Id. at 835-36.
184 Id. at 835; see also Sandin, 515 U.S. at 504 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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discretion, then a prisoner may not have an enforceable expectation in a particular
outcome or procedure in this context. 185
While this final approach resembles the Hewitt methodology overruled
by Sandin, Lee argues that most courts still use Hewitt as an analytical tool
when considering due process claims.186 Thus, the acceptance of a Hewitt-
like consideration would strengthen courts' due process analysis.
This approach enables the courts to consider both the atypical and the
significant considerations of the Sandin test. In addition, the test gives
weight to the prisoner's expectations that are created by the state and
enables courts to conduct a state-specific analysis. Finally, the baseline
depends on state practices and therefore is state-specific, rather than
specific to each court of appeals.
The most significant problem with this test is that determining the
baseline requires empirical evidence that rarely exists, if at all, in a form
useful for courtroom analysis.' 87 Compiling that evidence on a state-by-
state basis would require a substantial undertaking, diverting labor and,
more importantly, money away from other valuable programs. While a
compilation of this information would clearly be valuable, the logistics of
obtaining and organizing information in every state render it unfeasible.
One solution is to change the burden of production and persuasion. To
implement her lplan, Lee suggests that the state should have the burden of
production since the relevant statistical information will be "exclusively in
the [state's] possession."'' 88  In addition, the state should also have the
burden of persuading the court that a given practice is typical, rather than
atypical. 189  The state would have an incentive to collect the relevant
statistical information, so that it can demonstrate that the action in question
is one which the 'typical' inmate faces. In the absence of such statistical
information, the state can point to its procedural guidelines and expert
testimony to describe the typical conditions of prison. Finally, the prisoner
still has the burden of persuading the court that his deprivation was
significant, which should guard against meritless claims.'
90
185 Lee, supra note 159, at 837.
186 Id. at 837.
'87 See id. at 839-40.
188 Id. at 840.
189 Id.
190 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 504 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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B. THE REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS
Thus, courts should find a liberty interest in two situations: (1) when
transfer results in conditions that impose atypical and significant hardship;
and (2) when transfer results in loss of parole eligibility. A determination
of atypical and significant hardship depends on establishing the baseline,
which will be derived by evaluating state practices and state law. Once a
liberty interest has been established, however, the procedures necessary to
meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause must be established.
1. Which Test?
In Austin, the Court analyzed the procedural requirements for
placement into OSP using the Mathews balancing test.' 9' However, the
Court used a different approach in the parole cases. In Morrissey, the Court
listed what it considered to be the minimum requirements to satisfy due
process.192  Then, in Wolff and Greenholtz, the Court removed specific
requirements in each case because the liberty interest in each was less.
93
Thus, there are two different approaches to determine what minimum
requirements are necessary to satisfy the requirement of due process. The
Mathews test balances the liberty interest with the benefit gained by the
additional procedures and the government's interest.1 94 This test provides a
framework by which courts can "evaluate the sufficiency of particular
procedures."' 95 More importantly, this test allows each situation to be
evaluated in context, preserving the flexible nature of due process
protection.
96
Conversely, in the parole cases, the Court starts with a list of minimum
requirements, then adds or subtracts requirements based on the liberty
interest involved.197 The list of minimum requirements would give prison
administrators and inmates a clear description of what procedures the Court
expects. The requirements listed in Morrissey include the absolute minimal
requirements of due process-notice and the opportunity to be heard-as
well as disclosure of the evidence, the opportunity to present and confront
witnesses, a neutral hearing board and a written statement of the reasons for
191 See Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 2394 (2005).
'92 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
193 See supra Section II.C. 1.
194 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
'" Austin, 125 S. Ct. at 2395.
196 Id.
197 See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,489 (1972).
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revoking parole.19 These requirements are consistent with minimum
requirements suggested by a group of correctional professionals:
To ensure the reliability and integrity of the decision to place a prisoner in a
[S]upermax prison, the following are necessary and can be provided without undue
burden on prison staff.
1. There should be a clear legal standard - criteria - upon which the decision is
based....
2. The prisoner should know in advance what is at issue in the hearing....
3. The hearing process of necessity will combine the inquisitorial with the
adversarial. If facts must be withheld from the prisoner the hearing body must
inquire about the facts to ensure their reliability....
4. Prisoners should be able to call witnesses when there are facts at issue that
witnesses may shed light on....
5. [T]he hearing body must be independent, but must be willing, indeed required,
to make its own inquiry of witnesses and information when further inquiry is
indicated....
6. In its decision, the hearing body should specifically find the facts upon which it
relies and analytically relate those facts to the criteria for placement and
retention....
7. The fact finding and analytic reasoning process need to be specific enough to
allow meaningful review of the decision at higher levels of the prison system.
Thus, adhering to a list either derived from Morrissey or defined by
correctional professionals would ensure that once a liberty interest was
created, inmates would be guaranteed certain basic procedural rights.
However, a list of minimum requirements imposed by the courts
defeats the flexible nature of due process, which calls for procedures to be
evaluated by considering the "particular situation.', 200 Perhaps in response
to this need for flexibility, the Court has added and subtracted requirements
from the list depending on the liberty interest at issue.2°t While this process
allows the Court to evaluate the procedures needed for specific situations, it
defeats the purpose of having a list of required procedures. If the
requirements vary depending on the situation, a Mathews-like balancing test
would be more appropriate. Finally, in Sandin, the Court suggested that
"federal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state
officials trying to manage a volatile environment., 20 2 Imposing a list of
198 id.
199 Corrections Professionals, supra note 16, at 16-18 (footnotes omitted).
200 Austin, 125 S. Ct. at 2395.
201 See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13-16
(1979); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560 (1974).
202 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995).
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procedural requirements forces the court to interfere with day-to-day
management of the prison instead of properly deferring to prison
administrators, an approach the Court explicitly rejected in Sandin.20 3
One option is to use the Mathews test when confinement invokes a
liberty interest and using the minimum requirements list when parole
invokes the interest. However, this approach would cause considerable
confusion as well as create unnecessary inconsistency. Having two sets of
requirements, depending on which branch of a standard a court chooses to
invoke, is overly confusing and burdensome. Furthermore, when both
confinement and parole can invoke a liberty interest, choosing which test to
use can be both difficult and arbitrary.
The alternative to maintaining two sets of standards is to use the
Mathews test to balance all procedural requirements, whether the liberty
interest is invoked through confinement, parole or both. However, the
Court should always keep in mind the minimum requirements listed in
Morrissey and strive to meet those requirements whenever those
requirements would not overly burden the government. This combination
test would require courts to first look at the three Mathews factors to
evaluate the current procedures, as well as the procedures sought by the
inmates. Next, courts would ask whether the additional procedures listed in
Morrissey would benefit the inmate without overly burdening the
government. This test would enable courts to maintain the flexibility
required by the Due Process Clause while ensuring that the value of each
core procedural requirement is evaluated.
2. The Additional Procedures Required
In light of this analysis, the Supreme Court should require the
Department to add two procedures. First, the Department must provide
inmates with "adequate advance notice of all the reasons for the proposed
placement, and disclosure of the evidence subject to necessities of security
and safety, so the prisoner can respond meaningfully to them at the
placement hearing. 2 °4 Second, the Department should allow inmates to




204 Corrections Professionals, supra note 16, at 7 (emphasis added).
205 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Corrections Professionals, supra note
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The Department currently provides "a basic statement that [the inmate
is] being considered for reclassification., 20 6  Specifically, the notice
received by the inmates states: "You were referred to the Classification
Committee for the following reason(s)," followed by several blank lines.20 7
However, nothing requires the Department to tell the inmate the reason he
is being considered for transfer to OSP, only the reasons for referral to the
Committee.208 The Department should tell the inmate the reasons why he is
being considered for transfer, and outline the evidence supporting these
reasons. Otherwise, the inmate cannot adequately prepare for the hearing
because he will have no idea what the hearing is about.20 9
Similarly, the inmate must be allowed to call witnesses to resolve
factual disputes unless there are overriding security considerations.
Without a witness, an inmate's evidence is merely an allegation-one
person's word against another's. Witnesses enable the inmate to
substantiate his story and establish the facts of a situation. As Justice
Marshall observed, without witnesses, "a disciplinary board cannot resolve
disputed factual issues in any rational or accurate way.,
210
These procedures would neither overly burden the government nor
interfere with the state's interest, especially in light of the benefit these
procedures would provide the inmate.21  The Department should already
know the evidence and reasons for OSP placement consideration when the
notice is issued. Thus, this requirement merely forces the Department to
give the inmate advance notice of what evidence will be used against him.
The benefit is the opportunity to establish the truth, the ultimate goal of any
hearing. The state does face an increased burden by allowing inmates to
call witnesses because of the danger of retribution and coercion. However,
the state could refuse to allow witnesses when the state is concerned with
security. This safeguard would address the state's burden, while inmates
would benefit from the added procedural requirement when security is not
as great a concern.
206 Oral Transcript, supra note 97, at 10.
207 Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719, 750 (N.D. Ohio 2002), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 372 F.3d 246 (6th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 125 S. Ct. 2384 (2005); Joint Appendix at 58,
Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384 (2005) (No. 04-495), available at 2005 WL 273552.
208 Austin, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 750.
209 Id.; see also Oral Transcript, supra note 97, at 28-29 (testimony of Jules Lobel, esq.)
(explaining that the notice gives vague notice: "[You get] a notice. The notice said you're a
gang leader. How is a man supposed to respond to a vague notice that I'm a gang leader
when he doesn't know what it is that they are saying is their-is the reason that he's a gang
leader?").
210 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
211 See Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384.
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The witness's safety could be ensured by allowing the hearing board to
interview witnesses anonymously, without the inmate present. For
example, the inmate could submit a list of witnesses to contact and a list of
questions to ask. Those witnesses would then be called to testify in front of
the hearing board that would ask all relevant questions, including those
provided by the inmate. The witness can refuse to testify for safety
concerns, and the state can refuse to call a witness if the state is concerned
for his safety. The hearing board could question both inmates and prison
guards in this fashion, then compile and analyze the statements, and issue
its ruling based on those statements. The inmate would see only the ruling
and the evidence used to support that ruling, not the entire record. This
procedure would allow the hearing board to get a complete picture of the
facts without the inmate knowing who testified and who testified to what.
3. The Release Decision
Finally, the Court should have addressed the procedures governing the
inmate's continued placement and eventual release from OSP. When faced
with the decision to release an inmate from OSP back to the general prison
population, prison administrators must balance two factors.2 12 First, prison
administrators must minimize the inmate's exposure to the harsh conditions
at OSP in the interest of the inmate's health, while maintaining the general
safety and security of the prison and the general population.21 3 In addition,
to be released from OSP, an inmate must progress down two security levels,
then stay free of any rule violations for twenty-four consecutive months or
214else receive a security override from the reclassification committee.
Therefore, an inmate will spend a minimum of two years at OSP before he
can be transferred to a less restrictive prison, barring the expiration of his
sentence.
The amount of time an inmate must remain at OSP and the importance
of the release decision to the inmate and to the general prison population
highlights the magnitude of the continued placement and release decisions.
Consequently,
the decision and process for review of [S]upermax confinement must be just as careful
and reliable as the process for placing them in it initially, and should be similar to that
initial placement. The need for clear standards, notice to the prisoner of what will be
at issue at the hearing, inquiry into factual issues, and specificity in fact-finding and
212 Corrections Professionals, supra note 16, at 18-20.
213 Id.
214 INSPECTION REPORT, supra note 3.
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relating those facts to the standard for retention in [S]upermax confinement are
equally important at the review stage.215
In other words, the release decision is just as important as the
placement decision, and requires the same procedural protection as the
placement decision.
C. T1HE FUTURE OF THE SUPERMAX PRISON
1. Future Supermax Challenges
The number of Supermax prisons in the United States has risen
significantly in the last twenty-five years,216 and there is little reason to
believe that states will abandon their investments in these new, state-of-the-
art maximum-security facilities.217 Thus, the challenges to placement in
Supermax prisons will only continue. Clear policy and procedural
guidelines to govern Supermax placement, retention, and release are
essential to ensure that inmates receive adequate due process at every step
of imprisonment. In fact, "[tlhe decision to place a prisoner in Supermax
confinement is actually more significant than prison discipline, because it
affects the quality of life of individual prisoners more than virtually every
disciplinary sanction."'2 18 It is absolutely critical that the Supreme Court
provide appropriate guidance to ensure that every inmate is guaranteed the
minimum requirements of due process when facing transfer to a Supermax
prison.
2. An Eighth Amendment Claim
Another issue for future courts and litigants to consider is whether an
Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment challenge to Supermax
prisons would be more productive than a Fourteenth Amendment claim,
such as in Austin.219 Though the respondents originally filed an Eighth
Amendment claim in Austin, the parties settled this issue before trial, and
the district court never addressed the claim.22°
215 Corrections Professionals, supra note 16, at 19-20 (footnotes omitted).
216 See SUPERMAX HOUSING, supra note 25.
217 For example, OSP cost $65 million to construct. INSPECTION REPORT, supra note 3.
218 Corrections Professionals, supra note 16, at 10.
219 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
220 Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719, 722 (N.D. Ohio 2002), af/'d in part, rev'd
in part, 372 F.3d 246 (6th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 125 S. Ct. 2384 (2005).
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Supermax prisons have faced Eighth Amendment challenges in the
past.22 ' Though critical of the harsh conditions in Supermax prisons, courts
have been reluctant to alter prison conditions and interfere with prison
administration.222 Courts have only gone so far as to hold that prisons
cannot transfer mentally ill prisoners to Supermax prisons without violating
the Eighth Amendment. 223 Thus, the only Eighth Amendment claims that
have succeeded do not analyze the conditions of the prison itself, but,
rather, the characteristics of the inmates placed in that prison.224
These Eighth Amendment claims allow the courts to analyze a
tangential aspect of prison administration-placement of mentally ill
prisoners-instead of considering the conditions of the prison themselves.
Similarly, a Fourteenth Amendment claim, such as the one in Austin,
challenges procedural aspects of Supermax placement, not the Supermax
conditions themselves. 5  Thus, "[a] successful Fourteenth Amendment
claim.., represents much less significant judicial interference with the
administration of the prison, and the argument for deference is
correspondingly weaker in such a situation, though a court's response to the
[S]upermax conditions may be just as strong" as in an Eighth Amendment
claim. 6 As a result, future challenges to Supermax prisons will likely rely
on a procedural Fourteenth Amendment claim, as in Austin, rather than a
substantive Eighth Amendment claim. This consequence confirms the
importance of clearly articulated standards by the Supreme Court.
V. CONCLUSION
Transfer to a Supermax prison is one of the most critical decisions
affecting prisoners, given the severity of the conditions at Supermax prisons
and the fact that transfer to a Supermax prison almost invariably increases
the length of a prisoner's incarceration.227 A clearly articulated liberty test
is essential to provide guidance to lower courts facing challenges to
Supermax prisons, to prison administrators establishing procedures for
placement in Supermax prisons, and to inmates being transferred to
221 Mikel-Meredith Weidman, Comment, The Culture of Judicial Deference and the
Problem of Supermax Prisons, 51 UCLA L. REv. 1505 (2004).
222 Id. at 1532.
223 Id.; see, e.g., Jones'E1 v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1098 (W.D. Wis. 2001); Ruiz
v. Johnson, 154 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1000 (S.D. Tex. 2001); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp.
1146, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
224 Weidman, supra note 221, at 1542.
225 Id. at 1548.
226 Id.
227 Corrections Professionals, supra note 16, at 10.
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Supermax prisons. The Supreme Court's failure to establish a clearly-
defined standard will only increase the uncertainty in the area of due
process challenges to prison transfers.
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